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One of the  stated  objectives of this  conference  is to  explore  how  harmonization,
convergence  and compatibility (H/C/C) of agriculture policies, programs  and regulations
could avoid costly trade disputes between NAFTA partners.  This paper comments on two
very different perspectives  within the livestock and poultry industries.
Bill Kerr and Dermot Hayes, in their paper,  have used the example of the livestock
and red meat sectors to demonstrate how Canada-U.S.  trade, which is ostensibly  free (all
tariffs will be  removed by  January  1,  1998), can  still be peppered  by  a variety  of trade
irritants and disputes. In fact, their paper suggests that removal of formal tariffs may in fact
engender an increase  in the number of trade actions as domestic  industries seek protection
under any cloak  that  fits.  As  conference participants  discussed  earlier,  to the  cloaks of
technical  regulations  (grading  and  inspection),  health  standards,  countervail  actions,  and
Section 332 investigations,  may be added the new cloak of environmental regulations.  The
point  to emphasize  is  that these  disputes  are  occurring  in  a  sector  where  the  domestic
agriculture policies in Canada and the United States are compatible, if not harmonized.  The
discongruity is not in the policy environment,  but in the regulatory one.
This is not to say that these sectors have not benefited from free trade.  As the authors
have  shown,  however,  the high "fulfilment  costs"  of the "resource  intensive  activity"  of
removing non-tariff barriers and preventing new ones from being implemented has restricted
the full potential of  these benefits from being realized.  Along with convergence in tariffs  and
regulations, there needs to be a change in the mind set of industry.  Expectations  need to be
managed.
Harry de Gorter and Robert de Valk, in their paper,  attempt to demonstrate,  through
the example of Canada-U.S. trade disputes in the dairy and poultry industries,  how different
agriculture policies make H/C/C  difficult and  lead to conflict.  This paper, however,  deals
less with H/C/C than it does with one side of a Canadian  domestic agriculture  policy issue.
Their paper also  contains  many gratuitous  comments,  factual  errors and unsubstantiated
conclusions,  some of which are  addressed below.208  Proceedings
These  authors  indicate  that the  disputes  in  these  industries  go  back  at  least two
decades.  In fact, the origins  go much farther back; back to the original GATT negotiations,
at which time Canada opposed U.S. attempts to exempt agriculture from stringent disciplines
for trade in industrial products.'  The compromise result in  1947 was the limited exemption
for agriculture  contained in GATT Article XI  2(c)(I).  It quickly became  evident, however,
that even this limited discipline was too stringent for the United States, as it was not prepared
to bring its Agricultural  Adjustment Act (1933) programs  in line with GATT Article XI.  In
1995, therefore,  the United States sought and obtained a waiver from GATT disciplines  for
its Section 22 import quotas.
Notwithstanding  the  substantial  progress  in  reducing  normal  agricultural  tariffs,
Canada and the United States were never able to negotiate the liberalization  of quantitative
import  restrictions  which  covered  the  U.S.  dairy,  sugar,  peanut  and  cotton  sectors
(throughout virtually all of the post-World War II period) and the  import quotas  on supply-
managed  products  (which  Canada progressively  introduced,  primarily during the  1970s).
The U.S. reliance on its Section 22 import quotas  and Canada's reliance on Article XI 2(c)(I)
import quotas  in support  of its supply-managed  dairy,  poultry and  egg sectors were well
entrenched  by  the early-1980s  when  the  first  suggestions  of a  Canada-U.S.  Free  Trade
Agreement  began to emerge.
In their history of the dispute, de  Gorter and de Valk  give significant  weight to the
1976 GATT Working Party report on Canadian  import quotas on eggs.  In their view, the
working party was a watershed event in the  development of supply management in Canada
as the ruling in Canada's favour gave Canadian policy makers confidence that GATT Article
XI  could  be  used  effectively  to  block  imports.  Rather than  the  egg working  party,  the
watershed  point  for  national  supply  management  in  Canada  (more  for  domestic
considerations  than  international  ones)  was  1970.  It was  in  1970, after  intense  federal-
provincial discussions, the Canadian federal  government proposed  legislation to permit the
establishment  of national  supply management  systems  consistent  with the  provisions  of
GATT Article  XI 2(c)(I) (remember that this avenue had been open to all GATT members,
including Canada,  since  1947, and only the United States with its  1955 GATT waiver did not
have to meet the GATT's stringent criteria).  This strategy of stabilizing prices by controlling
production  and/or marketing on  a national  basis  led to the implementation of a system of
supply management  with the National Milk Marketing Plan (NMMP) between  1970 and
1974, as  each province joined the  Plan.  Concurrent with the NMMP, the Farm Products
Marketing Agencies  Act  of  1972  provided  for  the  establishment  of national  marketing
agencies in the poultry industries with authority to allocate national output among each of
the provinces.
'For  a detailed historical overview of Canada-U.S.  agricultural  disputes for these
industries,  see:  Michael Hart, Damned ifyou Do and Damned ifyou Don't: The Trials and
Tribulations of Canada-US  Agriculture Trade, Occasional Paper No. 38, Centre for Trade Policy
and Law.
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Supply management  is a unique Canadian marketing system that has been viewed as
a  kind of "industrial  strategy"  to  maintain  agricultural  production  in  all  regions  of the
country, while contributing to the development of rural Canada,  and ensuring the survival
of the  traditional  "family  farm"  structure.  Historically,  the  core  objectives  of supply
management in Canada is to provide efficient producers with the opportunity of obtaining
a fair return for their labour and investment,  while providing consumers with a continuous
and adequate supply of high quality products.
Canada's  national  supply  management  systems  have  their  roots  in  the  troubled
agricultural conditions of the 1960s:  surpluses were accumulating,  and prices and incomes
were low and unstable.  Although producer marketing boards with varying degrees of  power
had become fairly well-established  at the provincial level, they had very little authority to
regulate  interprovincial trade and none to regulate international trade.  Matters changed  in
the late-1960s, more because of interprovincial than international factors.  New production,
management and shipping techniques had increased the supply of agricultural products on
an interprovincial basis.  The limitations of provincial marketing boards had become clearly
evident.  While  provincial  regulation  was  effective  in  managing  the  production  and
marketing of products such as fluid milk which are bulky and perishable, and products  such
as tobacco that are produced almost exclusively in one province, supply management on a
national  basis  was  required  to  deal  with  products  for  which  there  was  interprovincial
competition.
In order  to  operate  its national  supply management  systems  effectively,  Canada
adopted  measures  to monitor and control  imports  of supply-managed  products.  Without
these measures,  the stability provided  by the  national  policies  would be undermined  by
imports, as it would be impossible  for the national agencies to determine domestic demand
accurately and allocate domestic quotas accordingly.
The  1988 GATT Panel on Ice Cream and Yogurt ruled that Canada's import quotas
on ice  cream and yogurt were inconsistent with Canada's GATT obligations under Article
XI  because they were deemed not to be "like" products with milk.  Instead of focusing on
that ruling, the authors chose instead to focus on an aspect that the panel chose not to rule on
-that of restricting production.  The authors  muse about how beneficial it would have been,
for certain  industry sectors in Canada, had the panel ruled on this matter.  The fact that there
is over-production  does not ipsofacto mean that production  is not restricted.  All producers
attempt  to  produce  to  the  maximum  of  their  allocation.  The  vagaries  of  agriculture
production,  however,  are such that they rarely hit that number exactly, being either slightly
under  or slightly  over.  As the  integrity  of the  system  depends  on  production  meeting
demand,  to counterbalance  the producers'  desire  to maximize  their production,  there  are
prohibitive over-production penalties in place that provide a real disincentive to over produce
and ensure that production remains  restricted.
In the Canada-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement  (FTA) negotiations,  not just Canada, but
neither country was prepared to negotiate the removal of quantitative  import restrictions.
In the first substantive meeting between the Canadian  and U.S. negotiating teams, the
U.S. negotiators made it clear that they were prepared to work towards the elimination
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of all normal agricultural tariffs, but that Section  22 import quotas, export subsidies
to third markets  and  domestic  agricultural  support could only be negotiated  in the
GATT where  other countries,  in particular those of the European Community, could
be engaged.2
The Canadians will not eliminate  their quota program on eggs and egg products.  It
will  continue  in  effect,  just  as  some  of  our  agriculture  programs,  dairy  for
example...We  do have an opportunity to remove the quotas  in the Uruguay round and
we  did deliberately  leave  a lot  of these  agricultural  issues  for the Uruguay  round
because they are  global issues,  rather than bilateral ones.3
Both countries  recognized at the time that the rules related to market access under the
GATT would probably  be modified as a result of the Uruguay Round, which had just gotten
underway.  However, neither country knew in what manner these modifications  might occur.
The eventual agreement for dealing with this uncertainty was the wording in FTA Article 710
which stated that both countries retain their GATT rights,  including those under Article XI.
Regarding de Gorter's and de Valk's comments on the FTA, they state that the increase
in access "granted" to the United States for poultry was an "arbitrarily chosen number".  In
any  trade negotiation,  nothing is granted,  and nothing is chosen  arbitrarily.  The level of
access is a negotiated  one, and the bilateral  deal was to provide access at the current level of
imports (imports within the existing quota as well as  supplemental  imports).  Regarding the
NAFTA Panel and  a new anti-dumping  and countervail dispute settlement system, the two
are unrelated.  The NAFTA panel falls under Chapter 20, while anti-dumping and countervail
are covered  by the dispute settlement provisions of Chapter  19.  The  Canadian government
has stated that it remains committed to pursuing a new dispute settlement  system as it was
at the time it negotiated the FTA.  In fact, the recently concluded Canada-Chile  free trade
agreement  includes  a provision to eliminate  anti-dumping actions.
An important  point raised  by  the  authors  is  that  much  has  been  achieved  in the
harmonization  of the regulatory  environment since the  signing of the FTA.  It is interesting
to note that this harmonization  is occurring  in the poultry industries despite continuing tariff
barriers.  This is not to say that the Canadian market is closed.  There is significant trade.  For
chicken, Canada is the United States' 7th largest export market by volume and 4th largest by
value. In  1996, the United States exported  56 million kilograms  of  chicken to Canada valued
2 Counter-Submission of Canada, North American Free Trade Agreement Chapter
Twenty Panel in the matter of tariffs applied by Canada  to certain U.S.-origin agricultural
products, February  19,  1996, p.1.
3 United States-Canada  Free Trade Agreement. Hearings  Before the Subcommittee on
Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 100th Congress, 2d Session 56 (1988)
(statement of Hon. Clayton Yeutter,  U.S. Trade Representative,  February 9,  1988).
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at $141  million.4 Furthermore,  the economic rent of these  imports  is worth  another $60
million to Canadian import quota holders, which includes retailers,  distributors, food service
operators,  further  processors  and  processors.  The  difference  between  bilateral  trade  in
chicken and beef is that the chicken Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) effectively  dictates the terms
of trade - the level of imports  and who  gets them, while trade  in beef is  driven more  by
market dynamics.  As the terms of  trade are well-established,  the trade that is permitted flows
freely without regulatory impediment,  as witnessed by the fact that the TRQ is consistently
fully utilized.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations were conducted
at a time when the results of the Uruguay Round negotiations were not known.  There was
general agreement to phase-out normal tariffs but there was no agreement on how non-tariff
barriers were to be handled.  Canada refused to prejudice  its Uruguay Round  negotiating
position of clarifying  Article XI and indicated that, while it was prepared to phase-out all
normal tariffs,  it would maintain its import quotas on supply-managed products.
The end result was that Canada and the United States did not engage in any market
access negotiations.  The United  States and Mexico,  and Canada and Mexico conducted
separate bilateral  market access  negotiations  on agriculture.  Canada and the United  States
agreed to incorporate the key provisions of Chapter Seven of the FTA into the NAFTA.  The
only trilateral provisions of the agricultural chapter in the NAFTA were those dealing with
non-market access issues.
From  the  beginning  of  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  Canada  pressed  for
clarification of GATT Article XI as a means of improving market access opportunities while
still maintaining import restrictions  in support of effective  supply management programs.
In March of 1990, Canada tabled a detailed proposal  for strengthening and clarifying Article
XI.
The  United  States  was proceeding  on  a  different  track  in  the  negotiations,  i.e.,
comprehensive tariffication.  The United States circulated a paper on tariffication  in Geneva
on November  7,  1988, and this proposal  was further  developed  in a discussion paper  on
tariffication  submitted  to the GATT  by  the United States  in July,  1989.  Eventually  the
concept of  tariffication  was incorporated  as a central  feature of the market  access section of
the draft agriculture negotiating  texts.  Canada,  however,  continued to press  for a solution
incorporating  changes to Article  XI until the close of negotiations  in December,  1993.  The
end result of the Uruguay Round was tariffication.
During a number of occasions throughout  1994, Canada and the United States met to
discuss the implications  of the Uruguay Round results for the agricultural provisions of the
4 Under the terms of the FTA, the United States has access equal to 7.5 percent of
Canada's  domestic production during the previous year.  As a result of increased Canadian
production, U.S. exports have risen from 34 million kilograms in  1988 to 56 million kilograms in
1996.  The value of these exports has increased to $141  million from $66 million over the same
time frame.  The tariff rate applied to these within-quota imports will be reduced to zero  as of
January  1, 1998.
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NAFTA.  The United  States argued that tariff equivalents  could not be applied to bilateral
trade.  When  it became  apparent that  the  legal  differences  could not  be bridged, the  two
countries attempted to negotiate a pragmatic package which would put the legal differences
to one side  for five or six years.  These discussions  failed to reach an agreement and in late-
1994 the United  States indicated it would pursue its interests through the dispute settlement
provisions of the NAFTA.
Regarding  the NAFTA Panel itself,  the question  was not whether the World Trade
Organization  (WTO)  took precedence  over the NAFTA,  as claimed  by de Gorter and  de
Valk.  The  United  States  fully  conceded  that  Canada's  tariff  equivalents  were  WTO
consistent.  What they questioned was whether they also met Canada's independent NAFTA
obligations.  And what the  panel unanimously agreed  was that Canada's conversion of its
import quotas to tariff equivalents was fully consistent with the NAFTA by virtue of  NAFTA
Annex 702.1  which incorporated  FTA Article 710.  WTO tariffication did not increase tariffs
or  introduce  new  ones, what  it did was  convert import  quotas  to tariff equivalents  - a
process  sold by the United States to GATT Parties  as trade liberalizing.
De Valk and de Gorter erroneously imply that the United States can now take this case
to  the WTO.  Nothing  is  further  from the  truth.  NAFTA  Chapter 20  clearly  states  that a
country  can choose the NAFTA or the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Furthermore,  as
mentioned above, the United States conceded in the NAFTA Panel that Canada's tariffication
fully met its WTO obligations.
The authors then make the bold assertion that now that tariffication  is in place "the
need for national supply management agencies to maintain effective control over production
is removed."  Just  as national  supply management  was  not put in place  simply  to obtain
import controls, the  change  in the  nature of import controls does not obviate  the need  for
domestic  supply management.  As  noted earlier, controls  over both domestic  and  import
supply are essential to operate supply management effectively.  Just as control  over domestic
supply was not enough in the  1970s, neither would control over imports  alone be enough in
the  1990s and beyond.
Leaving aside the arguments on the merits of supply management and the proposition
that the Canadian  industry should be harmonized  to the U.S. model (and not the other way
around),  I propose to look at an issue that I believe is leading to increased  confrontation, and
that is the creation of"unrealistic  expectations".
I agree with the authors that unrealistic expectations created in the United States have
played a  large role  in this dispute.  But,  more than just stiffening the resolve of Canadian
industry  to  force the  United  States to  abide  by  the  agreements  it has  negotiated,  it  has
convinced  U.S.  industry of its right to unlimited  access  to the  Canadian  market for these
products.  In order to sell the  Uruguay Round to Congress,  the U.S. Administration had to
demonstrate  the benefit of the WTO Agreement  on Agriculture  to U.S.  industry.  The U.S.
government stated that the United  States would gain access  to the $1 billion dairy industry
in Canada.  This did not happen.  No matter-  the U.S. government said it would challenge
these tariffs as NAFTA inconsistent and there was no way it could loose.  But loose  it did,
and clamour did the industry.  In the  same vein, the  U.S.  government has  created  similar
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unrealistic  expectations regarding wheat shipments from Canada,  i.e., that the United States
can  legally  do  something  about  them.  For  political  expediency  purposes,  the  U.S.
government  has not been forthright with its industry.  This has created increased political
pressure in the United States against these decisions as well as the dispute settlement process
itself.  This is a dangerous game that the government is playing, by insinuating that Canadian
policies or trade are actually WTO or NAFTA incompatible.
De Gorter and de Valk make several recommendations to settle the dairy and poultry
dispute.  First, I would point out that the dispute has been settled  by a NAFTA panel.  The
United States has, and continues to try to obtain through dispute settlement and other means
what  it  was  unable  to  negotiate  bilaterally  in  the  FTA,  trilaterally  in  the  NAFTA  or
multilaterally  in the WTO.  That aside, as for the specific recommendations:
1.  It will  never  be  possible  to develop  a  meaningful  and representative  live
poultry  price  from  U.S.  integrated  processors  as  there  is  no  live  price.
Contract growers  are not paid for their product, but only for their labour.
2.  As demonstrated by the blue ribbon commission on wheat, this is a political
process that is not conducive to settling disputes.
3.  Canada continues to push for clearer trade remedy and safeguard regimes.
4.  Harmonization of regulatory  issues should proceed.
5.  Interprovincial trade in goods in Canada and milk marketing order reform in
the United  States are domestic  matters and  it is not appropriate  to deal  with
them  in  an  international  forum.  It  is  sufficient  to  agree  that  domestic
policies/regulations  will  be  brought  into  conformance  with  negotiated
international commitments.
6.  The best,  and only, venue to address these issues is during the next round of
WTO agricultural trade negotiations scheduled to begin in  1999.
In  conclusion, the  two papers  have highlighted two telling aspects  on how  H/C/C
implications affect trade disputes:
1.  On the  one hand,  as Bill  Kerr and Dermot  Hayes highlight, the  continuing
frictions in wheat, beef and pork trade demonstrate  that tariff-free  trade does
not necessarily  negate disputes; regulatory issues continue to be irritants.
2.  On the other hand, as de Valk and de Gorter point out, there has been progress
made on regulatory  issues in the poultry industries,  demonstrating that tariff
barriers,  which  effectively  determine the terms  of trade,  can  create  a non-
confrontational environment  in which non-tariff issues can be addressed.
3.  In general, with the huge change engendered by the Uruguay Round bringing
agriculture more fully within international trade disciplines, we may see more
trade disputes, in the short term, as agriculture industries around the globe are
forced to adapt quickly to new trading environments.
Dungate 213214  Proceedings
Given  these  observations,  perhaps  the  solution  is  for  the  next  round  of  WTO
agriculture negotiations to consider the Mercosur  proposal for Free Trade of the Americas
Agreement  (FTAA)  negotiations  as  an  option.  Mercosur  has  proposed  a  three  stage
negotiation process.  During the first stage, talks would focus on business facilitation issues
such as customs  documentation  measures,  certification of origin,  and acceptance  of SPS
certificates.  The  second  stage  would  encompass  norms  and  disciplines  such  as
administration  of customs  procedures,  investment  promotion  and  protection  regimes,
technical  standards,  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures,  antidumping  and  countervail
measures, transparency  in government procurement,  professional services and intellectual
property rights.  Only once these issues are satisfactorily  solved would negotiations begin on
market access, export subsidies and competition policy.5
5 Special Report. MAercosur plan at odds with U.S.,  Canada  on start  datefor FTAA  talks,
in Inside U.S. Trade, February  28,  1997.
214 Proceedings